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Abstract
While many solutions for privacy-preserving convex empirical risk minimization (ERM) have been
developed, privacy-preserving nonconvex ERM remains under challenging. In this paper, we study
nonconvex ERM, which takes the form of minimizing a finite-sum of nonconvex loss functions over
a training set. To achieve both efficiency and strong privacy guarantees with efficiency, we propose
a differentially-private stochastic gradient descent algorithm for nonconvex ERM, and provide a tight
analysis of its privacy and utility guarantees, as well as its gradient complexity. We show that our proposed
algorithm can substantially reduce gradient complexity while matching the best-known utility guarantee
obtained by Wang et al. (2017). We extend our algorithm to the distributed setting using secure multi-party
computation, and show that it is possible for a distributed algorithm to match the privacy and utility
guarantees of a centralized algorithm in this setting. Our experiments on benchmark nonconvex ERM
problems and real datasets demonstrate superior performance in terms of both training time and utility
gains compared with previous differentially-private methods using the same privacy budgets.
1 Introduction
For many important domains such as health care and medical research, the datasets used for training machine
learning models contain sensitive personal information. There is a risk that models trained on this data can
reveal private information about individual records in that training data (Fredrikson et al., 2014; Shokri et al.,
2017; Carlini et al., 2019). This motivates the research on privacy-preserving machine learning.
Much of this work has focused on achieving differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006), a rigorous definition
of privacy that provide statistical data privacy for individual records. In the past decade, many differentially
private machine learning algorithms for solving the empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem (3.1) have
been proposed (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Bassily et al.,
2014; Zhang et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Jayaraman et al., 2018; Wang and Gu, 2019a,b). Almost all of
them are for ERM with convex loss functions, but many important machine learning approaches such as
deep learning are formulated as ERM problems with nonconvex loss functions. In addition, these learning
problems are often of large-scale (the number of training examples, n, is large), requiring the use of stochastic
optimization algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Due to the nonconvex objective function
and the corresponding optimization problem at scale, deferentially-private algorithms for solving large-scale
nonconvex ERM are in high demand.
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Recently, several studies have advanced the application of differential privacy in deep learning (Abadi
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2018). They focus on satisfying differential privacy and evaluate
utility experimentally, but lack theoretical bounds on utility. Only a few differentially-private algorithms
for solving nonconvex optimization problems have proven utility bounds (Zhang et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2017). For example, Wang et al. (2017) proposed a differential private gradient descent (DP-GD) algorithm
with both privacy and utility guarantees. However, in each iteration of DP-GD, it needs to compute the full
gradient, which is too expensive for use on large training sets. Zhang et al. (2017) proposed a random round
private stochastic gradient descent (RRPSGD), which has better runtime complexity than DP-GD to achieve
the same privacy guarantee. However, its utility bound is slightly worse than that of DP-GD.
Our work develops a method for differentially-private nonconvex ERM that provides both strong utility
guarantees and low runtime complexity. Inspired by the recent progress on stochastic variance reduced
nonconvex optimization algorithms (Johnson and Zhang, 2013; Reddi et al., 2016a; Allen-Zhu and Hazan,
2016; Lei et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2017; Fang et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2018), we propose a Differentially-
Private Stochastic Recursive variance reduced Gradient Decent (DP-SRGD) algorithm for nonconvex ERM. At
the core of our algorithm is the stochastic path-integrated differential estimator proposed by Fang et al. (2018),
which tracks the full gradient with significantly reduced variance compared with the standard stochastic
gradient, and an analysis of the privacy guarantees using Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP) (Mironov, 2017).
Contributions. We develop a differentially-private stochastic variance reduced gradient algorithm for
nonconvex ERM and provide a sharp analysis of the privacy guarantee (Section 4). Our algorithm matches
the best-known utility guarantee (Wang et al., 2017) for nonconvex optimization with lower computational
complexity compared with prior methods (Zhang et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). To achieve the same
utility guarantee, the gradient complexity (i.e., the number of stochastic gradients calculated in total) of our
algorithm is O
(
n3/2
)
, which outperforms the state-of-the-art results (Zhang et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017)
by a factor of Θ(n1/2).
We further extend our algorithm to the distributed setting (sometimes known as federated learning
or distributed learning) using a multi-party computation protocol (Section 5). This results in the first
differentially-private distributed optimization algorithm with theoretical guarantees that match that of the
centralized differentially private nonconvex optimization algorithm.
We implement our proposed methods on two nonconvex ERM problems: nonconvex logistic regression
and convolutional neural networks. We report on experiments on several real datasets (Section 6), finding that
our methods can produce the models that are closest to the non-private models in terms of model accuracy.
Notation. We use curly symbol such as B to denote the index set. For a set B, we use |B| to denote its
cardinality. For a finite sum function F =
∑n
i=1 fi/n, we denote FB by
∑
i∈B fi/|B|. For a d-dimensional
vector x ∈ Rd, we use ‖x‖2 to denote its `2-norm. Given two sequences {an} and {bn}, if there exists
a constant 0 < C < ∞ such that an ≤ Cbn, we write an = O(bn). In addition, if there exist constants
0 < C1, C2 <∞ such that C1bn ≤ an ≤ C2bn, we writhe an = Θ(bn).
2 Related Work
Plenty of differentially-private machine learning algorithms for convex ERM have been proposed in the past
decade. Specifically, there are three main approaches to achieve differential privacy in such settings, including
output perturbation (Wu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017), objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011;
Kifer et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019), and gradient perturbation (Bassily et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017;
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Algorithm Utility Gradient Complexity
DP-GD
O
(
(d log(1/δ))1/4
(n)1/2
)
O
(
n2
)
(Wang et al., 2017)
RRPSGD
O
(
(d log(n/δ) log(1/δ))1/4
(n)1/2
)
O
(
n2
)
(Zhang et al., 2017)
DP-SRGD
O
(
(d log(1/δ))1/4
(n)1/2
)
O
(
n3/2
)
(This paper)
Distributed DP-SRGD
O
(
(d log(1/δ))1/4
(mn˜)1/2
)
O
(
(mn˜)3/2
)
(This paper)
Table 1: Comparison of different (, δ)-DP algorithms for nonconvex optimization. We report the utility
bound in terms of E‖∇F (θp)‖2, where θp is the output of differentially private algorithm, E is taken over the
randomness of the algorithm. For the Distributed DP-SRGD, m is the number of party and n˜ is the dataset
size of each party.
Jayaraman et al., 2018). However, it is very hard to generalize these methods to nonconvex ERM except for
the gradient perturbation approach. Therefore, most of the differentially private algorithms for nonconvex
ERM are based on the gradient perturbation approach, including our work in this paper. The problem with
gradient perturbation approaches is their iterative nature quickly consumes any reasonable privacy budget.
Hence, the main challenge for nonconvex ERM with differential privacy is to develop algorithms that can
provide sufficient utility while maintaining privacy with high computational efficiency.
Several recent works (Abadi et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2018) studied deep learning
with differential privacy. Abadi et al. (2016) proposed a method called moments accountant to keep track of
the privacy cost of stochastic gradient descent algorithm during the training process, which provides a strong
privacy guarantee. Papernot et al. (2016) established a Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE)
framework to improve the privacy guarantee of deep learning for classification tasks. Xie et al. (2018) and
Yoon et al. (2019) investigated the differentially private Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) with different
distance metrics. However, none of these works provide utility guarantees for their algorithms.
Table 2 summarizes provable differentially private nonconvex optimization algorithms for nonconvex
ERM. The only studies to date giving utility guarantees of their differentially private algorithms for nonconvex
optimization problems are Zhang et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2017). The random round private stochastic
gradient descent (RRPSGD) developed by Zhang et al. (2017) is the first differentially private nonconvex
optimization algorithm with the utility guarantee. Inspired by the random round SGD algorithm (Ghadimi
and Lan, 2013), Zhang et al. (2017) proposed to perform the perturbed SGD, i.e., adding Gaussian noise
to stochastic gradient in each iteration, for a random number of iterations, which is drawn from some
distribution. They showed that RRPSGD is able to find a stationary point in expectation with a diminishing
error O
(
(d log(n/δ) log(1/δ))1/4/(n)1/2
)
, where  is the privacy budget, n is the number of observations,
d is the dimension, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is confidence parameter for (, δ)-DP. In addition, the gradient complexity
of RRPSGD is O(n2). Their analysis of the privacy guarantee is mainly based on the previous framework
(Bassily et al., 2014), which makes use of the standard privacy amplification via sampling and strong
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composition theorem. Although such an analysis can be easily adopted to the nonconvex setting with
stochastic optimization algorithms, it will result in a large bound on the variance of the adding noise
compared with relaxed definitions such as the moments accountant (Abadi et al., 2016).
Wang et al. (2017) proposed a differentially private gradient descent (DP-GD) algorithm for nonconvex
optimization. They showed that DP-GD has a comparable gradient complexity O(n2), and an improved
utility guarantee O
(
(d log(1/δ))1/4/(n)1/2
)
compared with that of RRPSGD. The reason that DP-GD can
achieve such improvement, i.e., by a factor of O
(
(log(n/δ))1/4
)
, is that DP-GD uses full gradient rather than
stochastic gradient. Nevertheless, this makes DP-GD computationally very expensive or even intractable for
large-scale machine learning problems (n is big). Recently, Wang et al. (2019a) also proposed a differentially
private method for solving the nonconvex optimization problem based on stochastic gradient descent. Their
goal is to find the local minima, while our aim is to find the stationary point. In addition, their utility guarantee
is asymptotic, i.e., they need to run an infinite number of iterations to get the proposed utility guarantee. In
sharp contrast, our utility guarantee holds for a finite number of iterations.
Although distributed machine learning enables collaborative learning across different parties, the privacy
requirement becomes more acute. In such setting, each party not only needs to provide protection against
inference attacks on the learned model but also wishes to share nothing about its own records with other
parties throughout the learning process. There is a series of work (Pathak et al., 2010; Bindschaedler et al.,
2017; Heikkila¨ et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2017; Chase et al., 2017; Jayaraman et al., 2018) studying differential
privacy in distributed setting. The most relevant one to ours is the multi-party computation (MPC) based
framework studied in Jayaraman et al. (2018). They proposed to aggregate different parties’ local gradients
with a secure computation, and perturbed it within the MPC. Although their method can achieve the state-
of-the-art theoretical guarantees in the setting of convex optimization, it does not have privacy or utility
guarantee in the nonconvex optimization settings.
3 Preliminaries
We consider the empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem: given a training set S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
drawn from some unknown but fixed data distribution with xi ∈ RD, yi ∈ Y ⊆ R, we aim to find a solution
θ̂ ∈ Rd that minimizes the empirical risk,
min
θ∈Rd
F (θ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi(θ), (3.1)
where F (θ) is the empirical risk function (i.e., training loss), fi(θ) = `(θ;xi, yi) is the loss function defined
on the i-th training example (xi, yi), and θ ∈ Rd is the model parameter we want to learn.
Here, we provide some definitions and lemmas that will be used in our theoretical analysis.
Definition 3.1. θ ∈ Rd is an ζ-approximate stationary point if ‖∇f(θ)‖2 ≤ ζ.
Definition 3.2. A function f : Rd → R is G-Lipschitz, if for all θ1,θ2 ∈ Rd, we have
|f(θ1)− f(θ2)| ≤ G‖θ1 − θ2‖2.
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Definition 3.3. A function f : Rd → R has L-Lipschitz gradient, if for all θ1,θ2 ∈ Rd, we have
‖∇f(θ1)−∇f(θ2)‖2 ≤ L‖θ1 − θ2‖2.
Differential privacy provides a formal notion of privacy, introduced by Dwork et al. (2006):
Definition 3.4 ((, δ)-DP (Dwork et al., 2006)). A randomized mechanismM : Sn → R satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy if for any two adjacent data sets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by one element, and any output
subset O ⊆ R, it holds that
P[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ e · P[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ.
To achieve (, δ)-DP for a given function q : Sn → R, we can use Gaussian mechanism (Dwork and
Roth, 2014)M = q(S)+u, where u is sampled from Gaussian distribution with variance that is proportional
to the `2-sensitivity of the function q, ∆(q), which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.5 (`2-sensitivity(Dwork and Roth, 2014)). For two adjacent datasets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by
one element, the `2-sensitivity ∆(q) of a function q : Sn → R is defined as
∆(q) = sup
S,S′
‖q(S)− q(S′)‖2.
Re´nyi differential privacy. Although the notion of (, δ)-DP is widely used in the output and objective
perturbation methods, it suffers from the loose composition and subsample amplification results, which make
it unsuitable for the stochastic iterative learning algorithms. In this work, we will make use of the notion of
Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP), which is proposed by Mironov (2017), and is particularly useful when the
dataset is accessed by a sequence of randomized mechanisms (Wang et al., 2019b).
Definition 3.6 (RDP (Mironov, 2017)). For α > 1, ρ > 0, a randomized mechanismM : Sn → R satisfies
(α, ρ)-Re´nyi differential privacy, i.e., (α, ρ)-RDP, if for all adjacent datasets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by one
element, we have Dα
(M(S)||M(S′)) := logE(M(S)/M(S′))α/(α− 1) ≤ ρ, where the expectation is
taken overM(S′).
To achieve RDP, we can use Gaussian mechanism and its corresponding subsample amplification results.
Lemma 3.7. Given a function q : Sn → R, the Gaussian MechanismM = q(S)+u, where u ∼ N(0, σ2I),
satisfies (α, α∆2(q)/(2σ2))-RDP. In addition, if we apply the mechanismM to a subset of samples using
uniform sampling without replacement,M satisfies (α, 5τ2∆2(q)α/σ2)-RDP given σ′2 = σ2/∆2(q) ≥ 1.5,
α ≤ log(1/τ(1 + σ′2)), where τ is the subsample rate.
Remark 3.8. According to Lemma 3.7, let ∆2(q) = 1, to achieve (α, 5τ2α/σ2)-RDP of the subsampled
Gaussian mechanism, we need the conditions that σ2 ≥ 1.5, α ≤ log(1/τ(1 + σ2)). For the moment
accountant based method (Abadi et al., 2016), it can achieve the following asymptotic privacy guarantee of(
α, τ2α/(1− τ)σ2 +O(τ3α3/σ3))-RDP when τ goes to zero and σ2 ≥ 1, α ≤ σ2 log(1/τσ). In contrast
to moment accountant, our method has a closed-form bound on the privacy guarantee.
We also have the following composition rule for RDP.
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Algorithm 1 Differentially-Private Stochastic Recursive variance reduced Gradient Descent (DP-SRGD)
input θ0, T,G, L, δ, β, privacy budget , accuracy for first-order stationary point ζ
1: for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 do
2: if mod (t, l) = 0 then
3: vt = ∇F (θt), draw ut ∼ N(0, σ21Id) with σ21 = 2TG2α/(βn2), α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1− β))+ 1
4: Release the differentially private gradient vtp = v
t + ut
5: else
6: Uniformly sample b examples without replacement indexed by Bt
7: vt = ∇FBt(θt)−∇FBt(θt−1) + vt−1p , where∇FBt(θt) =
∑
i∈Bt ∇fi(θt)/b
8: Draw ut ∼ N(0, σ22Id) with σ22 = 20Tζ2α/(βn2), α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1− β))+ 1
9: Release the differentially private gradient vtp = v
t + ut
10: end if
11: θt+1 = θt − ηtvtp, where ηt = min{ζ/(L‖vtp‖2), 1/(2L)}
12: end for
output θ˜ chosen uniformly at random from {θt}T−1t=0 .
Lemma 3.9 (Mironov (2017)). If k randomized mechanismsMi : Sn → R for i ∈ [k], satisfy (α, ρi)-RDP,
then their composition
(M1(S), . . . ,Mk(S)) satisfies (α,∑ki=1 ρi)-RDP. Moreover, the input of the i-th
mechanism can base on the outputs of previous (i− 1) mechanisms.
Based on Lemmas 3.7 and 3.9, we will use RDP-based analysis to establish the privacy guarantee of our
algorithms, which can give us a strong utility guarantee. Finally, we illustrate the relationship between RDP
and (, δ)-DP in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.10 (Mironov (2017)). If a randomized mechanismM : Sn → R satisfies (α, ρ)-RDP, thenM
satisfies (ρ+ log(1/δ)/(α− 1), δ)-DP for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
4 Algorithm
Our proposed algorithm for nonconvex ERM can be seen as an extension of the stochastic recursive
variance-reduced gradient descent algorithm (Nguyen et al., 2017; Fang et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2018) for
finite-sum nonconvex optimization. The detailed algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The main idea is that
we will construct the gradient estimator vt iteratively based on the information obtained from the previous
update. More specifically, we initialize the vt to the current full gradient every l iterations, and inject Gaussian
noise ut with covariance matrix σ21Id into v
t, i.e., line 3, to make it differentially private. In the subsequent
(l − 1) iterations, we recursively update vt, i.e., line 7, as vt = ∇FBt(θt) − ∇FBt(θt−1) + vt−1p , where
∇FBt(θt) and ∇FBt(θt−1) are mini-batch stochastic gradients, and vt−1p is the private gradient estimator
released at the last iteration. After updating vt, we again inject Gaussian noise ut with covariance matrix
σ22Id, i.e., line 9, to make it differentially private. The variance σ
2
1 and σ
2
2 of the Gaussian random vectors are
determined by our later RDP-based analysis.
6
4.1 Main Theoretical Results
Here, we present formal results on the privacy and utility guarantees of Algorithm 1. Our proof involves new
techniques for the privacy and utility guarantees that are of general use for variance reduction-based algorithms.
In particular, we propose an RDP-based analysis (the full proof is in Appendix B.1) for characterizing the
privacy loss of our method. It considers two different cases to characterize the sensitivity of our method:
(1) at the beginning of each epoch, i.e., mod (t, l) = 0; and (2) the subsequent (l − 1) iterations in each
epoch. To provide the utility guarantee (the full proof is in Appendix B.2), we provide a new bound for the
difference between the full gradient and our differentially private gradient estimator vt. Equipped with this
bound, we show that the utility guarantee of our method depends on the accuracy of the first-order stationary
point ζ as well as the error introduced by our privacy mechanism. By solving for the smallest ζ, we obtain
the utility guarantee for our method.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that each component function fi is G-Lipschitz and has L-Lipschitz gradient.
Given the total number of iterations T and the accuracy for the first-order stationary point ζ, for any
δ > 0 and the privacy budget , Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy with σ21 = 2TG
2α/(βn2)
and σ22 = 20Tζ
2α/(βn2), where α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1 − β)) + 1, if there exits β ∈ (0, 1) such that
α ≤ log (βn3/(5b3Tα+ βbn2)) and 5b2Tα/(βn2) ≥ 1.5.
Remark 4.2. According to Theorem 4.1, there exist a constraint on the parameter α, which is due to the
subsample amplification result in Lemma 3.7, and is similar to the constraint given by moments accountant
(Abadi et al., 2016). This constraint can be removed if we use the analytic framework proposed by Bassily
et al. (2014). However, such an analysis would introduce an extra log(T/δ) factor in the variance σ2 of the
noise, which will lead to a worse utility guarantee. Since β is a constant, we will omit the dependence of β in
our results in the rest of the paper.
The following theorem shows the utility guarantee and the gradient complexity, which is the total number
of the stochastic gradients we need to estimate during the training process, of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4.3. Under the same conditions of Theorem 4.1 on fi, σ2, α, if we choose l = b =
√
n, the
number of iterations T = C1n
√
LDF /
(
G
√
d log(1/δ)
)
, where DF = F (θ0) − F (θ∗) and F (θ∗) is a
global minimum of F , the accuracy for first-order stationary point ζ = C2G1/2
(
LDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
/(n)1/2,
the output θ˜ of Algorithm 1 satisfies the following
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 ≤ C3G1/2
(
LDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
/(n)1/2,
where C1, C2, C3 are absolute constants, and the expectation is taken over all the randomness of the algorithm,
i.e., the random Gaussian noise and the subsample gradient. Since we have T = O(n) and l = b =
√
n, the
total gradient complexity of Algorithm 1 is (T/l · n+ Tb), which is at the order of O(n3/2).
Remark 4.4. Our method can achieve a utility guarantee in O
(
G1/2(dLDF log(1/δ))
1/4/(n)1/2
)
, which
matches the best known result for differentially private nonconvex optimization method (Wang et al., 2017).
However, their method is based on gradient descent, which is computationally very expensive in large-scale
machine learning problems. Compared with the stochastic gradient method proposed by Zhang et al. (2017),
our utility guarantee is better by a factor of O(log(n/δ)). Furthermore, the gradient complexity of our
method, i.e., O(n3/2), is smaller than O(n2) gradient complexity provided by Zhang et al. (2017) and
Wang et al. (2017).
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5 Extension to Distributed Private Learning
For many important problems, the training data is owned by different parties but too sensitive to expose to a
single party to perform the learning. The primary goal of distributed machine learning is to enable a group of
independent data owners to develop a model from their combined data without exposing that data to others.
Any differentially private ERM method in distributed setting must also satisfy this primary goal.
5.1 Problem Setup and Algorithm Description
More formally, suppose that we have m parties, and without loss of generality, each party has n˜ examples. In
specific, party j has its own data set Sj = {(xj1, yj1), . . . , (xjn˜, yjn˜)}, which may contain sensitive information.
We use S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} to denote the combined dataset. Our goal is to solve the following nonconvex
ERM problem such that each party does not release their own data to others and the learned model satisfies
differential privacy.
min
θ∈Rd
{
F (θ) : =
1
m
m∑
j=1
F j(θ) =
1
mn˜
m∑
j=1
n˜∑
i=1
f ji (θ)
}
,
where F j(θ) denotes the empirical loss function for party j, where each component function f ji (θ) =
`(θ;xji , y
j
i ) for party j is G-Lipschitz and has L-Lipschitz continuous gradient.
A straightforward way to extend Algorithm 1 to the distributed setting would be to add noise to each
party’s local gradient before the aggregation. Similar ideas have been previously exploited in Pathak et al.
(2010). However, this requires that the variance σ2 of the adding noise scales inversely proportional to
n˜. To further reduce the noise magnitude, we incorporate secure multi-party computation (MPC) into our
algorithmic framework, as was done by Jayaraman et al. (2018) for convex ERM.
By using cryptographic techniques, MPC protocols enable participants to compute a functionality in a
joint way over their private inputs. Several recent works (Nikolaenko et al., 2013; Gasco´n et al., 2017; Ma
et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018), have shown that MPC protocols can be efficiently employed in distributed
machine learning, including deep learning. However, MPC protocols by themselves only protect the training
data throughout the learning process; they provide no protection on the resulting model against inference
attacks. Thus, we propose to combine differential privacy with MPC protocols in the distributed setting.
The key modification of our Distributed Differentially-Private Stochastic Recursive variance reduced
Gradient Descent (DDP-SRGD) is that each party first computes local gradients and then the local gradients
are aggregated within the MPC. Differential privacy is ensured by perturbing the aggregated gradients with
Gaussian noise inside the MPC framework (line 3 and line 7 of Algorithm 2).
5.2 Main Results for Distributed Setting
In this subsection, we present the privacy and the utility guarantees for our distributed method.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that each component function f ji is G-Lipschitz and has L Lipschitz gradient.
Given the number of iterations T and the accuracy for the first-order stationary point ζ, for any δ > 0
and the privacy budget , Algorithm 1 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy with σ21 = 2TG
2α/(βmn˜2)
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Algorithm 2 Distributed Differentially-Private Stochastic Recursive variance reduced Gradient Descent
(DDP-SRGD)
input θ0, T,G, L, δ, β, privacy budget , accuracy for first-order stationary point ζ
1: for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 do
2: if mod (t, l) = 0 then
3: Inside MPC: vt = ∇F j(θt), ut ∼ N(0, σ21Id), σ21 = 2TG2α/(m2n˜22), α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1 −
β)
)
+ 1
4: Release the differentially private gradient vtp = v
t + ut
5: else
6: Generate index set Bjt with |Bjt | = bj for each party j by sampling without replacement
7: Inside MPC: vt =
∑m
j=1
∑
i∈Bjt
(∇f ji (θt)−∇f ji (θt−1))/(mb¯) + vt−1p , where b¯ = ∑mj=1 bj/m,
ut ∼ N(0, σ22Id), σ22 = 20Tζ2α/(m2n˜22), α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1− β))+ 1
8: Release the differentially private gradient vtp = v
t + ut
9: end if
10: θt+1 = θt − ηtvtp, where ηt = min
{
ζ/(L‖vtp‖2), 1/(2L)
}
11: end for
output θ˜ chosen uniformly at random from {θt}T−1t=0 .
and σ22 = 20Tζ
2α/(βmn˜2), where α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1 − β)) + 1, if there exits β ∈ (0, 1) such that
α ≤ log (βn˜3/(5b¯3Tα+ βb¯n˜2)) and 5b¯2Tα/(βn˜2) ≥ 1.5.
Remark 5.2. In distributed settings, our method can ensure differential privacy if we add the noise that
scales inversely proportional to mn˜ (instead of n˜, which would be the case with the straightforward approach
if noise were added to each party’s subsampled gradients before the aggregation).
Next, we give the utility guarantee and gradient complexity of our proposed distributed method.
Theorem 5.3. Under the same conditions of Theorem 5.1 on f ji , σ
2, α, if we choose l =
√
mn˜, b¯ =
√
n˜/m,
the total number of iterations T = C1mn˜
√
LDF /
(
G
√
d log(1/δ)
)
, and the accuracy for the first-order
stationary point ζ = C2G1/2
(
LDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
/(mn˜)1/2, where DF = F (θ0) − F (θ∗) and F (θ∗) is a
global minimum of F , the output θ˜ of Algorithm 2 satisfies
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 ≤ C3G1/2
(
LDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
/(mn˜)1/2,
where C1, C2, C3 are absolute constants, and the expectation is taken over all the randomness of the algorithm.
In addition, the gradient complexity of distributed method is O
(
(mn˜)3/2
)
.
Theorem 5.3 establishes that the utility guarantee of our distributed method is O˜
(
G1/2(LDF )
1/4/(mn˜)1/2
)
,
which matches the utility guarantee of Algorithm 1 if n = mn˜.
6 Experiments
In this section, we present numerical experiments on different nonconvex ERM problems and on different
datasets to evaluate the performance of our method. All experiments are implemented in Pytorch platform
version 0.4.0 within Python 3.6.4. on Amazon AWS p3.2xlarge servers which come with Intel Xeon E5 CPU
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Privacy Non-private
Method Test Error
Data
CPU time (s) Gradient NormBudget Baseline Passes
 = 0.2 0.3351
DP-GD 0.3961 (0.0044) 20 1.681 0.0480 (0.0028)
DP-AGD 0.3628 (0.0042) 360 92.74 0.0406 (0.0023)
RRPSGD 0.3806 (0.0035) 8 27.52 0.0460 (0.0019)
(0.004) DP-SRGD 0.3552 (0.0032) 4 0.5120 0.0390 (0.0018)
DDP-SRGD 0.3563 (0.0030) 4 10.71 0.0401 (0.0022)
 = 0.5 0.3351
DP-GD 0.3705 (0.0039) 20 1.714 0.0470 (0.0014)
DP-AGD 0.3576 (0.0042) 365 95.42 0.0385 (0.0025)
RRPSGD 0.3651 (0.0023) 10 33.55 0.0387 (0.0019)
(0.004) DP-SRGD 0.3473 (0.0028) 5 0.5720 0.0364 (0.0013)
DDP-SRGD 0.3481 (0.0029) 5 12.15 0.0382 (0.0015)
Table 2: Comparison of different algorithms on a9a dataset under different privacy budgets  ∈ {0.2, 0.5}
and δ = 10−5. Note that the non-private baseline denotes the test error of the non-private SPIDER algorithm
(Fang et al., 2018). For DDP-SRGD, we choose the number of parties m = 10.
and NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU (16G GPU RAM). For the distributed learning setting, we randomly split the
training dataset into m subsets, where m is the number of parties, with the same number of training examples.
Details on our MPC implementation can be found in Appendix A.
6.1 Nonconvex Logistic Regression
The first nonconvex ERM problem we consider is the binary logistic regression problem with a nonconvex
regularizer (Reddi et al., 2016b)
min
θ∈Rd
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi log φ(x
>
i θ) + (1− yi) log
[
1− φ(x>i θ)
]
+ λ
d∑
i=1
θ2j/(1 + θ
2
j ),
where φ(x) = 1/
(
1 + exp(−x)) is the sigmoid function, θj is the j-th coordinate of θ, and λ > 0 is the
regularization parameter. We set the regularization parameter as λ = 0.001 in this experiment.
Datasets. We consider two commonly-used binary classification benchmarks: a9a dataset and ijcnn1 dataset.
More specifically, a9a dataset has 32561 training examples, 16281 test examples, 123 features, and ijcnn1
dataset has 9990 training examples, 91701 test examples, 22 features.
Baseline methods. We compare our method (DP-SRGD) with random round private stochastic gradient
descent (RRPSGD) proposed by Zhang et al. (2017) , differentially private gradient descent (DP-GD)
proposed by Wang et al. (2017), and differentially private adaptive gradient descent (DP-AGD) proposed by
Lee and Kifer (2018).
Parameters. For all the algorithms, the step size is tuned around the theoretical values to give the fastest
convergence using grid search. For our method, we tune the batch size b by searching the grid {50, 100, 200}.
We set C = 2 for the a9a experiments and C = 1 for ijcnn1 experiments. We choose two different privacy
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Privacy Non-private
Method Test Error
Data
CPU time Gradient NormBudget Baseline Passes
 = 0.2 0.2120
DP-GD 0.2954 (0.0049) 20 0.4760 0.0120 (0.0018)
DP-AGD 0.2650 (0.0041) 346 24.81 0.0103 (0.0016)
RRPSGD 0.2831 (0.0047) 8 27.51 0.0160 (0.0022)
(0.002) DP-SRGD 0.2475 (0.0036) 5 0.3750 0.0078 (0.0008)
DDP-SRGD 0.2520 (0.0033) 5 10.68 0.0080 (0.0009)
 = 0.5 0.2120
DP-GD 0.2581 (0.0034) 20 0.4750 0.0009 (0.0011)
DP-AGD 0.2376 (0.0029) 365 95.42 0.0385 (0.0025)
RRPSGD 0.2582 (0.0031) 10 32.89 0.0120 (0.0018)
(0.002) DP-SRGD 0.2349 (0.0027) 5 0.4240 0.0044 (0.0007)
DDP-SRGD 0.2396 (0.0028) 5 12.19 0.0052 (0.0007)
Table 3: Comparison of different algorithms on ijcnn1 dataset under different privacy budgets  ∈ {0.2, 0.5}
and δ = 10−5. Note that the non-private baseline denotes the test error of the non-private SPIDER algorithm
(Fang et al., 2018). For DDP-SRGD, we choose the number of party m = 10.
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Figure 1: Experiment results for nonconvex logistic regression on a9a dataset. (a), (b) Objective loss versus
number of epoch. (c), (d) Gradient norm versus number of epoch.
budgets  ∈ {0.2, 0.5}, and set δ = 10−5.
Gradient clipping and privacy tracking. We use the gradient clipping technique of Abadi et al. (2016)
to ensure that ‖∇fi‖2 is upper bounded by some predefined value C. This will ensure that the Lipschitz
constant G is upper bounded by C, and give us the desired privacy protection. At each iteration, we add the
Gaussian noise with variance σ2, and keep track of the RDP according to Lemmas 3.7 and 3.9. We then
transfer it to the (, δ)-DP according to Lemma 3.10.
Results. Due to the randomized nature of all the algorithms, the experimental results are obtained by
averaging the results over 10 runs. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the objective function value and the gradient
norm of different algorithms for privacy budgets  ∈ {0.2, 0.5} on a9a and ijcnn1 datasets respectively. Our
DP-SRGD algorithm outperforms other three baseline algorithms in terms of objective loss, gradient norm,
and convergence rate by a large margin, which aligns with our theoretical results. Table 6.1 and Table 6.1
demonstrate the test error of different algorithms as well as the CPU time (in seconds) of the training process
on a9a and ijcnn1 dataset respectively. Our experimental results show that our algorithm convergences faster
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and can achieve a better test error on the test set than the comparison baselines.
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Figure 2: Experiment results for nonconvex logistic regression on ijcnn1 dataset. (a), (b) Objective loss
versus number of epoch. (c), (d) Gradient norm versus number of epoch.
6.2 Convolutional Neural Networks
We compare our algorithm with the differentially-private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) algorithm
proposed by Abadi et al. (2016) on training a convolutional neural network for image classification on the
MNIST dataset (Scho¨lkopf et al., 2002). We use a network architecture that has two convolutional layers
followed by one fully-connected layer with the output size 10. More specifically, the convolutional layers use
16 and 32 filters of size 5 respectively, followed by a ReLU and 2× 2 max pooling.
Parameters. We set the the gradient clipping threshold C = 2, choose two different privacy budgets
 ∈ {2, 4}, and set δ = 10−5. For DP-SGD, we tune the batch size by searching the grid {256, 512, 1024}
and the step size by {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1}. For DP-SRGD, we tune the batch size b by searching the grid
{256, 512, 1024}, step size by {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1}, and use {2b, 4b, 8b} to approximate the full gradient.
Results. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the average test error of different methods versus the number of
data epochs under different privacy budgets over 10 trials. The CNN trained by the non-private SGD can
achieve 2% test error after 20 epochs. The result shows that our proposed method can achieve 4.88% and
3.47% test error under privacy budget  = 2 and  = 4 correspondingly, which are better than DP-SGD. In
addition, it can be seen that our method converges faster than DP-SGD. Figures 3(c) and 3(d) demonstrate
the test error versus CPU time of distributed DP-SRGD with different number of parties m ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16}
under different privacy budgets. We do not consider the MPC cost for generating noise here and defer it to
Section A. We can see from the result that the proposed algorithm can achieve similar performance as the
centralized DP-SRGD algorithm.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an efficient differentially private algorithm for nonconvex ERM. We prove both
privacy and utility guarantees for our proposed algorithm, and extend it to distributed learning setting.
Both theoretical analyses and experiments demonstrate the advantage of our algorithms compared with the
state-of-the-art.
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Figure 3: Experimental results for CNN on MNIST dataset. (a), (b) depict the test error versus data epochs
under different privacy budgets. (c), (d) illustrate the test error versus CPU time with different number of
parties under different privacy budgets for distributed learning.
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A Implementation of Secure Aggregation
We implemented the secure aggregation and noise generation inside the MPC framework using Obliv-C (Zahur
and Evans, 2015). Obliv-C converts any computation into garbled circuit which can be securely evaluated.
This is essentially a two-party protocol where one party (generator) encodes the secure computation into
garbled circuit and sends it to the other party (evaluator) along with his share of input keys. The evaluator
then securely requests his share of input keys from the generator via oblivious transfer protocol. Evaluator
then evaluates the garbled circuit using the input shares of both parties to obtain the final output of the
computation. Similar to the approach of Jayaraman et al. (2018), we first aggregate the gradients of all the
parties and then sample the noise which is added to the aggregated gradients, all within the MPC framework.
The main difference is that we sample Gaussian noise instead of the Laplace noise as used by Jayaraman et
al. We use the ratio of uniforms method (Kinderman and Monahan, 1977) to sample Gaussian noise, where
the parties collaboratively generate two uniform random numbers which are then used to generate Gaussian
random number. Given two uniform random numbers u1 and u2 in the range (0, 1), then the corresponding
Gaussian value in the same range is given by their ratio x = (2u2 − 1)
√
2e−1/u1 provided the inequality
x2 ≤ −4 lnu1 is satisfied.
We consider 5 parties collaboratively running Algorithm 2 where they invoke secure aggregation to
aggregate their local gradients with differential privacy. Table A gives the cost of single invocation of secure
aggregation for nonconvex logistic regression on a9a and ijcnn1 datasets. The secure computation takes 18
seconds for a9a dataset and 3.5 seconds for ijcnn1 dataset. The MPC time scales linearly with the number
of parties and the size of the gradients to be aggregated. While the actual aggregation takes only small
fraction of time, the major computation overhead is due to the noise generation process which requires costly
operations like multiplication, division and logarithm using big integer library (Doerner, 2017). The garbled
circuit for a9a dataset consists of around 53.5 million garbled gates which corresponds to 1021.60 MB of
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Dataset a9a ijcnn1
Gradient Size 123 22
Gate Count 53,561,000 9,579,500
GC Bandwidth (MB) 1021.60 182.71
OT Bandwidth (MB) 22.88 3.89
Yao Runtime (sec) 18.04 3.52
DualEx Runtime (sec) 21.48 4.42
Table 4: Secure aggregation cost for nonconvex logistic regression
Layer Shape Gate Count GC Bandwidth (GB) Runtime (sec)
0 [16, 1, 5, 5] 174,183,700 3.24 58.97
1 [16] 6,966,700 0.13 2.56
2 [16] 6,966,700 0.13 2.57
3 [16] 6,966,700 0.13 2.57
4 [32, 16, 5, 5] 5,573,900,100 103.82 1872.73
5 [32] 13,934,100 0.26 4.92
6 [32] 13,934,100 0.26 4.92
7 [32] 13,934,100 0.26 4.90
8 [10, 1568] 6,828,027,800 127.18 2302.43
9 [10] 4,354,000 0.08 1.69
Table 5: Secure aggregation cost for convolutional neural network (MNIST dataset)
data transfer. Additional 22.88 MB bandwidth is used for oblivious transfer of key shares. For a9a dataset,
garbled circuit has around 9.5 million gates amounting to 182.71 MB. Oblivious transfer takes 3.89 MB.
While Yao’s garbled circuit protocol provides security against semi-honest adversaries, we also implemented
the dual execution protocol (Huang et al., 2012) which provides security against malicious adversaries but
leaks one bit of information. In this protocol, the garbled circuit protocol is executed twice such that the
parties exchange their roles in the second execution. Dual execution protocol takes 21.5 seconds for a9a
dataset and 4.4 seconds for ijcnn1 dataset.
Table 5 gives the cost of secure computation for convolutional neural networks over MNIST dataset.
Our CNN model consists of 10 layers of different sizes. We report the bandwidth cost and execution time
of aggregating the gradients for each individual layer. The shape of each layer defines the size of the
corresponding gradients, which in turn dictates the MPC cost. The total bandwidth of garbled circuit of all
the layers is 235.50 GB and the oblivious transfer bandwidth is 8.23 GB.
B Proofs of Main Results
In this section, we lay out the main proofs of our results.
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B.1 Proofs of Theorem 4.1
Proof. In this subsection, we will provide the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 1. We first show that our
proposed algorithm satisfies RDP using Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 3.9. Then we will transform it into
(, δ)-DP based on Lemma 3.10. In the following discussion, we use t0 to denote the iteration satisfying
mod (t0, l) = 0. For the given dataset S, we use S′ to denote its neighboring dataset with one different
example indexed by i′.
We useMt to denote the mechanism of Algorithm 1 after t-th iteration. Therefore, our goal is to show
the privacy guarantees ofMt for t = 1, . . . , T . Note that Algorithm 1 will reset the semi-stochastic gradient
vt to the current full gradient when t = t0, and then iteratively update it in the subsequent (l − 1) iterations.
Therefore, to show the privacy guarantee ofMt, we first consider the privacy guarantee from t0-th iteration
to t-th iteration, where t ∈ [t0, t0 + l).
Case 1: If t = t0, we have vt0 = ∇F (θt0), which implies the following Gaussian mechanism at t0-th
iteration
Gt0 = ∇F (θt0) + ut0 ,
where ut0 ∼ N(0, σ2t0Id). We first show that this mechanism satisfies RDP given appropriate ut0 .
Sensitivity. Consider the following query on the dataset S as follows qt0(S) = ∇F (θt0), where qt0(S)
denotes that qt0 is queried based on the dataset S. Thus, we have
qt0(S)− qt0(S′) =
1
n
(∇fi(θt0)−∇fi′(θt0)),
which implies the following `2-sensitivity of the t-th query
∆t =
1
n
‖∇fi(θt0)−∇fi′(θt0)‖2 ≤ 2G
n
, (B.1)
where the last inequality is due to the G-Lipschitz of each component function fi.
Privacy Guarantee of Gt0 . By Lemma 3.7, if we add noise with
σ2t0 =
2TαG2
βn2
, (B.2)
the mechanism Gt0 satisfies (α, ρ0)-RDP, ρ0 = β/T .
Case 2: If t 6= t0, i.e., t0 < t < t0 + l, we have the following mechanism
Mtt0 = ∇FBt(θt)−∇FBt(θt−1) + ut + vt−1p ,
where ut ∼ N(0, σ2t Id). First, we consider the following Gaussian mechanism
Gt = ∇FBt(θt)−∇FBt(θt−1) + ut.
Now, we are going to show that Gt satisfies RDP given appropriate ut. Note that the mechanism Gt is based
on the subsample approach, thus we will use the subsample amplification result, i.e., Lemma 3.7, to show
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that Gt satisfies RDP. To this end, we consider the following Gaussian mechanism without subsampling
G˜t = 1
b
n∑
i=1
∇fi(θt)− 1
b
n∑
i=1
∇fi(θt−1) + ut.
Sensitivity. We consider the following query without subsampling
q˜t(S) =
1
b
n∑
i=1
∇fi(θt)− 1
b
n∑
i=1
∇fi(θt−1),
which implies that
q˜t(S)− q˜t(S′) = 1
b
(∇fi(θt)−∇fi(θt−1)−∇fi′(θt) +∇fi′(θt−1)).
As a result, we can obtain the `2-sensitivity of the query q˜t as follows
∆˜t =
1
b
‖∇fi(θt)−∇fi(θt−1)−∇fi′(θt) +∇fi′(θt−1)‖2
≤ 2L
b
‖θt − θt−1‖2,
where the inequality is due to the L-Lipschitz continuous gradient of each component function. Furthermore,
according to the update rule of Algorithm 1 and the definition of ηt, we have
‖θt − θt−1‖2 ≤ ηt‖vt−1p ‖2 ≤ min
{
ζ
L‖vt−1p ‖2
,
1
2L
}
· ‖vt−1p ‖2 ≤
ζ
L
,
which implies that
∆˜t ≤ 2L
b
‖θt − θt−1‖2 ≤ 2ζ
b
. (B.3)
Privacy Guarantee of Gt. By Lemma 3.7, if we add noise with
σ2t =
20Tαζ2
βn2
, (B.4)
the mechanism G˜t satisfies
(
α, βn2/
(
10b2T
))
-RDP. Therefore, according to Lemma 3.7, we have that the
mechanism with subsampling Gt will satisfy (α, ρ1)-RDP if σ2t /∆˜2t ≥ 1.5, where ρ1 = β/T . Furthermore,
the variance σ2t should satisfy the following condition
σ2t
∆˜2t
=
5b2Tα
βn2
≥ 1.5.
As a result, we show that Gt satisfies (α, ρ1)-RDP.
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Privacy Guarantee ofMtt0 . Recall that, we have
Mtt0 = ∇FBt(θt)−∇FBt(θt−1) + ut + vt−1p . (B.5)
Start from t0, we have that the mechanism Mt0+1t0 is a composition of Gt0 and Gt0+1, i.e., Mt0+1t0 =
(Gt0 ,Gt0+1). Therefore, according to the definition ofMtt0 , we can getMtt0 = (Gt0 ,Gt0+1, . . . ,Gt). Accord-
ing to the composition property of RDP, i.e., Lemma 3.9, we haveMtt0 satisfies (α, (t− t0)ρ1 + ρ0)-RDP.
Privacy Guarantee of Algorithm 1. According to Algorithm 1, when t = t0, we will reset the semi-
stochastic gradient to the current full gradient, and iteratively update it in the subsequent (l − 1) iterations.
In addition, we have shown that from t0-th iteration to t-th iteration, where t ∈ [t0, t0 + l), the mechanism
satisfies (α, (t − t0)ρ1 + ρ0)-RDP. Therefore, according to Lemma 3.9, after T ′ iterations, we haveMT ′
satisfies (α, ρ′)-RDP, where we have
ρ′ ≤ T
′
l
ρ0 +
T ′
l
(l − 1)ρ1,
which implies thatMT ′ satisfies (α, T ′β/T )-RDP, where α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1 − β)) + 1. According to
Lemma 3.10, we haveMT ′ satisfies (T ′β/T + (1− β), δ)-DP. Finally, according to the definition of θ˜,
we have θ˜ satisfies (, δ)-DP. Recall that we have the following constraint on α according to Lemma 3.7
α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1− β))+ 1 ≤ log (1/τ(1 + σ′2)), where σ′2 = b2σ22/(4ζ2). In addition, we have
1
τ(1 + σ′2)
=
βn3
5b3Tα+ βbn2
,
which implies that α = log(1/δ)/
(
(1− β))+ 1 ≤ log (βn3/(5b3Tα+ βbn2)).
B.2 Proofs of Theorem 4.3
Proof. Note that we choose l =
√
n and b =
√
n. According to the assumption that each component function
has L-Lipschitz continuous gradient, we can obtain that
‖∇F (x)−∇F (y)‖2 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
‖∇fi(x)−∇fi(y)‖2 ≤ L‖x− y‖2,
which implies that F (x) has L-Lipschitz continuous gradient. Thus we have
F (θt+1) ≤ F (θt) + 〈∇F (θt),θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖22
= F (θt)− ηt〈∇F (θt),vtp〉+
η2tL
2
∥∥vtp∥∥22
= F (θt)− ηt〈∇F (θt)− vtp,vtp〉 − ηt
(
1− ηtL
2
)∥∥vtp∥∥22.
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By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we can further obtain that
F (θt+1) ≤ F (θt) + ηt
2
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 − ηt(12 − ηtL2
)∥∥vtp∥∥22
≤ F (θt) + ηt
2
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 − ηt4 ∥∥vtp∥∥22,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that ηt ≤ 1/(2L). In addition, we have
ηt
4
∥∥vtp∥∥22 = ζ28L min{2∥∥vtp/ζ∥∥2,∥∥vtp/ζ∥∥22} ≥ ζ
∥∥vtp∥∥2 − 2ζ2
4L
.
Thus we have
F (θt+1) ≤ F (θt) + 1
4L
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 − ζ
∥∥vtp∥∥2
4L
+
ζ2
2L
.
Let t0 = bt/
√
nc · √n, taking expectation given the previous observations after iterations 0, . . . , (t0 − 1),
we have
Et0F (θt+1)− Et0F (θt) ≤
1
4L
Et0
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
− ζ
4L
Et0‖vtp
∥∥
2
+
ζ2
2L
, (B.6)
where Et0 is taken over the randomness of t0, . . . , t given the observations after iterations 0, . . . , (t0 − 1).
Next, we are going to bound the term I1. Note that we have
Et
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22
= Et
∥∥∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1) +∇F (θt−1)−∇FBt(θt) +∇FBt(θt−1)− vt−1p − ut∥∥22
= Et‖∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1)−∇FBt(θt) +∇FBt(θt−1)‖22 + Et
∥∥∇F (θt−1)− vt−1p − ut∥∥22
= Et‖∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1)−∇FBt(θt) +∇FBt(θt−1)‖22 +
∥∥∇F (θt−1)− vt−1p ∥∥22 + Et∥∥ut∥∥22,
where Et is taken over the randomness at the t-th iteration given the observations after (t− 1)-th iteration,
the first equality is due to the definition of vt, the second and last equality comes from the independence of
the random variables. In addition, we have
Et‖∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1)−∇FBt(θt) +∇FBt(θt−1)‖22
≤ 1√
n
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
∥∥∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1)−∇fi(θt) +∇fi(θt−1)∥∥22
≤ 1√
n
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
∥∥∇fi(θt)−∇fi(θt−1)∥∥22
≤ L
2
√
n
‖θt − θt−1‖22,
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where the first inequality is due to Lemma D.1, the second one comes from the fact that E‖X − EX‖22 ≤
E‖X‖22 for any random variable X , and the last one is due to the gradient Lipschitz property of each
component function. According to the updating rule, we have
‖θt − θt−1‖2 ≤ ηt
∥∥vt−1p ∥∥2 ≤ min{ ζL∥∥vt−1p ∥∥2 , 12L
}
· ∥∥vt−1p ∥∥2 ≤ ζL,
which implies
Et‖∇F (θt)−∇F (θt−1)−∇FBt(θt) +∇FBt(θt−1)‖22 ≤
ζ2√
n
.
As a result, we can obtain
Et
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 ≤ ζ2√n + ∥∥∇F (θt−1)− vt−1p ∥∥22 + Et∥∥ut∥∥22
≤ ζ
2
√
n
+
∥∥∇F (θt−1)− vt−1p ∥∥22 + dσ2t . (B.7)
Taking expectation over t0, . . . , (t− 1), we can obtain that
Et0
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 ≤ (t− t0)ζ2√n + Et0‖∇F (θt0)− vt0‖22 + d
t∑
i=t0
σ2t
≤ ζ2 + Et0‖∇F (θt0)− vt0‖22 + d
t∑
i=t0
σ2t
≤ ζ2 + d
t∑
i=t0
σ2t , (B.8)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that t − t0 ≤
√
n and the last one is due to that fact that
vt0 = ∇F (θt0). As a result, we can get
I1 = Et0
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥22 ≤ ζ2 + d t∑
i=t0
σ2t . (B.9)
Plugging this result into (B.6), we can obtain
Et0F (θt+1)− Et0F (θt) ≤
3ζ2
4L
− ζ
4L
Et0
∥∥vtp∥∥2 + d4L
t∑
i=t0
σ2t
=
3ζ2
4L
− ζ
4L
Et0
∥∥vtp∥∥2 + dσ204L + d4L
√
n−1∑
i=1
σ21.
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Therefore, taking full expectation and summing over t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we have
ζ
4L
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥vtp∥∥2 ≤ F (θ0)− EF (θT ) + 3Tζ24L +
T−1∑
t=0
dσ20
4L
+
d
4L
T−1∑
t=0
√
n−1∑
i=1
σ21
≤ F (θ0)− F (θ∗) + 3Tζ
2
4L
+
T−1∑
t=0
dσ20
4L
+
T−1∑
t=0
d
√
nσ21
4L
, (B.10)
which implies
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥vtp∥∥2 ≤ 4LTζ (F (θ0)− F (θ∗))+ 3ζ +
T−1∑
t=0
dσ20
Tζ
+
T−1∑
t=0
d
√
nσ21
Tζ
≤ 4ζ +
T−1∑
t=0
dσ20
Tζ
+
T−1∑
t=0
d
√
nσ21
Tζ
, (B.11)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that T = b4L(F (θ0)− F (θ∗))/ζ2c+ 1.
According to the definition of θ˜, we have
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 = 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E‖∇F (θt)‖2
≤ 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥vtp∥∥2 + 1T
T−1∑
t=0
E
∥∥∇F (θt)− vtp∥∥2
≤ 5ζ +
T−1∑
t=0
dσ20
Tζ
+
T−1∑
t=0
d
√
nσ21
Tζ
+
T−1∑
t=0
√
dσ0
T
+
T−1∑
t=0
√
dn1/4σ1
T
, (B.12)
where the last inequality is due to (B.9), (B.11), and Jensen’s inequality.
According to (B.2) and (B.4), we have
σ20 ≤
4TG2 log(1/δ)
(1− β)βn22 and σ
2
1 =
40Tζ2 log(1/δ)
β(1− β)n22 .
Plugging these quantities into (B.12), we can get
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 ≤ 5ζ + 4TdG
2 log(1/δ)
(1− β)βn22ζ +
40Td
√
nζ log(1/δ)
(1− β)βn22 +
2G
√
dT log(1/δ)√
(1− β)βn
+
7ζ
√
dT log(1/δ)n1/4√
(1− β)βn
≤ 5ζ + 32LDFdG
2 log(1/δ)
β(1− β)n22ζ3 +
320LDFd
√
n log(1/δ)
β(1− β)n22ζ ,
where the last inequality is due to the definition of T and the fact that the second and third terms are the
dominate terms. If we choose ζ2 = G
√
dLDF log(1/δ)/(n), we have T = 4n
√
LDF /
(
G
√
d log(1/δ)
)
,
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and we can obtain that
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 ≤ C
G1/2
(
dLDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
(n)1/2
,
where C is an abosolute constant.
Gradient Complexity. Every
√
n iterations, we need to compute one full gradient, and
√
n times
stochastic gradient with batch size
√
n. Therefore, the total gradient complexity is⌈
T/
√
n
⌉ · n+ T√n ≤ (T/√n+ 1)n+ T/√n
≤ n+ 2T√n
≤ n+ 4L
√
n
(
F (θ0)− F (θ∗))
ζ2
,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that T ≤ 4L(F (θ0)− F (θ∗))/ζ2. As as result, the total gradient
complexity is less than O(n3/2).
B.3 Proofs of Theorem 5.1
Proof. In order to make use of Lemma 3.7 in the distributed setting, our subsample procedure should be
uniform sampling without replacement. This can be achieved by the following procedure. According to the
setup in section 5.1, we can define the following index set I = {j1, j2, . . . , jn˜}mj=1 with |I| = mn˜ and ji
corresponding to the i-th example from party j. Therefore, at t-th iteration, we can uniformly sample mb¯
index without replacement from I such that each party has a corresponding subsampled index set Bjt with
|Bjt | = bj and b¯ =
∑m
j=1 bj/m as illustrated in line 6 of Algorithm 2.
Now, we are ready to prove the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 2. According to the proof in the single
party setting, i.e., equations (B.1) and (B.3), we have
1
mn˜
‖∇fi(θt0)‖2 ≤ G
mn˜
and
1
mb¯
‖∇fi(θt)−∇fi(θt−1)‖2 ≤ ζ
mb¯
.
Therefore, following the same proof as in the centralized setting, we only need to replace the parameter n
with mn˜ is the distributed setting to get our privacy guarantee.
B.4 Proofs of Theorem 5.3
Proof. Note that we choose l =
√
mn˜ and b¯ =
√
n˜/m. The utility analysis of multi-party setting is similar
to the analysis of single party setting. According to (B.2) and (B.4), we have
σ20 ≤
2TG2α
βm2n˜2
and σ21 =
40Tζ2α
βm2n˜2
.
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If we choose ζ2 = G
√
dLDF log(1/δ)/(mn˜), we have T = 4mn˜
√
LDF /
(
G
√
d log(1/δ)
)
, and we can
obtain that
E‖∇F (θ˜)‖2 ≤ C
G1/2
(
dLDF log(1/δ)
)1/4
(mn˜)1/2
,
where C is an abosolute constant.
C Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. To prove the result of subsample amplification, we want to show that if a Gaussian mechanismM
satisfying
(
α, ρ(α)
)
-RDP, by applying it to a subset of samples with subsample rate τ , it satisfies
(
α, ρ′(α)
)
-
RDP, and we will provide an explicit upper bound for ρ′(α). Without loss of generality, we assume ∆(q) = 1.
According to Theorem 9 in Wang et al. (2019b), we have
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + τ2
(
α
2
)
min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)
}
+
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j)
)
, (C.1)
where τ is the subsample rate, ρ(j) = j/(2σ2). Next, we will show that the summation term on the right
hand side of the above inequality is dominated by the second term under certain conditions. First of all, when
σ2 is large, i.e., σ2 ≥ 1.5, we have
min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)
}
= 4(eρ(2) − 1) ≤ 8/σ2,
which implies that
τ2
(
α
2
)
min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)
}
≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
8/σ2.
Next, we consider the summation term in (C.1), and we have
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j) ≤ 2τ2
(
α
2
)( α∑
j=3
τ j−2αj−2e
(α−1)j
2σ2
)
≤ 2τ2
(
α
2
)
ταe
3(α−1)
2σ2
1− ταeα−12σ2
,
where the first inequality is due to the fact that
e(j−1)ρ(j) = e
(j−1)j
2σ2 ≤ e (α−1)j2σ2 and
(
α
j
)
=
α!
j!(α− j)! ≤
α!αj−2
2!(α− 2)! .
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In addition, the last inequality comes from the condition that τα exp
(
(α− 1)/(2σ2)) < 1 and the sum of
the geometric sequence. Therefore, as long as
α− 1 ≤ σ2 log 1
τα(1 + σ2)
, (C.2)
we have
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j) ≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
2
σ2
.
A sufficient conditions to ensure the (C.2) holds is that
α ≤ log 1
τ(1 + σ2)
.
In addition, we require that τα exp
(
(α − 1)/(2σ2)) < 1. By plugging the condition of α into the above
requirement, we can obtain that this condition can hold if τ < 1.
As a result, under the conditions that σ2 ≥ 1.5, α ≤ log(1/τ(1 + σ2)), we can obtain that
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + τ2
(
α
2
)
10
σ2
)
≤ 1
α− 1τ
2
(
α
2
)
10
σ2
≤ 5ατ2/σ2.
D Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma D.1. (Lei et al., 2017) Consider vectors ai satisfying
∑n
i=1 ai = 0. Let B be a uniform random
subset of {1, 2, . . . , n} with size m, we have
E
∥∥∥∥ 1m∑
i∈B
ai
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1{|B| < n}
mn
n∑
i=1
‖ai‖22.
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